In September 2022, when the European Union was preparing its seventh sanctions package against Russia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ireland proposed in a joint letter a “ban on nuclear energy cooperation with Russia. However, no sanctions against Russia in this area have been realized, even in the 10th package of sanctions against Russia in February 2023.

It is known that Hungarian opposition is behind this. But in truth, the situation is more complicated. The “results” of Russia’s long years of engagement in expanding its geopolitical influence have created a situation in which Russia cannot be easily excluded. Here, I would like to examine this overseas expansion of Russia’s nuclear energy industry in connection with geopolitics.

 

Basic Knowledge

The nuclear energy industry is involved in diverse fields, including uranium mining, low-enriched uranium (nuclear fuel assemblies) production, nuclear power plant construction, and reprocessing of spent fuel. In a broader sense, it is also related to the military industry, including the production of highly enriched uranium (nuclear weapons) and nuclear missiles.

One thing must never be forgotten. That is that “since March 1946, authorized officers with counterintelligence experience have been assigned to the agencies and laboratories involved in the implementation of the ‘atomic program’.” This statement was made by Alexander Bortnikov, director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), in an interview. In other words, we must be aware of the fact that the nuclear energy industry has also been under the control of the “Cheker,” a kind of secret police-like intelligence agency that has existed since the Soviet era. And that control continues to this day.

In Russia, the holding company, the Atomic Energy State Corporation Rosatom (“Rosatom”), is responsible for a series of nuclear-related activities. Under its umbrella, Atomredmetzolata (ARMZ) is responsible for uranium exploration, mining, processing, and other functions, and in 2013 integrated its domestic uranium mining assets (by the early 2000s, the state concern TVEL had integrated its mining assets and was the basis for the establishment of ARMZ). Russia, which has a large uranium enrichment business, also imports uranium ore. Because of the abundance of uranium ore in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and other countries of the former Soviet Union, the Russian government has placed particular emphasis on its relationship with Kazakhstan, and several joint ventures have been established on Kazakhstan’s territory for uranium mining.

Regarding uranium enrichment, the content of uranium 235 is generally around 0.3-0.4% in natural uranium ore, 4-5% in low-enriched uranium for nuclear power generation, and more than 90% highly enriched uranium is required for nuclear bombs. Uranium enriched by Russian centrifuges is internationally competitive because of its low cost. Noting this capability, in September 2007, Australia’s foreign minister signed a 30-year cooperation agreement with Rosatom’s president for the use of nuclear energy beginning in 2010. The agreement calls for Russia to purchase 4,000 tons of Australian uranium each year for about $1 billion, enrich it in Russia, and sell it overseas.

With the United States, for example, in May 2009, Russian nuclear exporter Texnavexport agreed with Fuel co LLC, which owns five nuclear power plants in the U.S., to supply low-enriched uranium for the 2014-2020 period in a massive billion-dollar deal. The deal is based on an agreement to allow the sale of Russian low-enriched uranium directly to U.S. users under an export quota for 2014-2020. Around the same time, Texnavexport also agreed with Chubu Electric Power Company to supply low-enriched uranium to the Hamaoka nuclear power plant. The contract was worth approximately US$100 million, and the supply was scheduled to continue until 2022.

Thus, Russian low-enriched uranium as nuclear fuel for nuclear power generation has been sold to developed countries. For example, nuclear fuel (fuel assemblies) was exported from Russia to the Lovisa nuclear power plant in Finland, which has two pressurized water-type power reactors, or VVERs (water-cooled moderated power reactors), which started commercial operation in 1977 and 1980. TVEL began supplying fuel assemblies to the plant in 1999. Japan’s government has also been working with Russia. In May 2009, Russian President Kiriyenko Rosatom and Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone signed an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The agreement guarantees the basis for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear energy sector for 25 years.

 

Rosatom’s Global Influence

With this basic knowledge, you will not be surprised to see the statement that “Rosatom is one of the top three players in the nuclear fuel cycle services market, ranking second in uranium mining, first in uranium enrichment, and third in fuel fabrication” (this is the same information found on page 19 of Rosatom’s “Annual Report 2021” ). This is why it is not easy to “slay” Rosatom.

The document published in May 2022 stated that there were 439 nuclear power reactors in operation in 2021, 38 of which were Russian VVERs operating domestically and 42 abroad. It further stated that 15 Russian-designed power reactors were under construction in other countries as of the end of 2021.

Regarding the U.S. dependence on Russia, it is noted that “Rosatom accounts for one-fifth of the enriched uranium in 92 U.S. power reactors.” Another “Washington Post” states that “In 2021, the United States purchased 14% of its uranium from Russia. Another source states that in 2021, 14% of its mined and refined uranium came from Russia, with the remainder purchased from Kazakhstan (35%), Canada (15%), Australia (14%), Namibia (7%), US domestic resources (5%) and five other countries (10%).

Unlike the immediate embargo on Russian oil, on which the country was less dependent, it was not easy to designate Rosatom as a sanctions target against Russia. This would have a major impact on domestic nuclear power generation itself.

Turning to Europe, Rosatom fuels and services many European nuclear power reactors, including those in Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Bulgaria and Slovakia depend on Rosatom’s TVEL fuel company to supply fuel to their VVERs. Electricite de France (EDF) and Flamatome cooperate extensively with Rosatom and sell their products to Rosatom.

In addition, there are a total of 19 Russian nuclear reactors: six in the Czech Republic, five in Slovakia, four in Hungary, two in Finland, and two in Bulgaria. Fifteen of these reactors are VVER-440s, and the remaining four are VVER-1000s. Ukraine also operates several power reactors of both types, including the Zaporizha nuclear power plant.

In addition, as shown in the table below, there are countries around the world that have cooperated with Rosatom in the construction of nuclear power plants. Therefore, as of February 2023, neither the U.S. nor the EU member states have been able to add Rosatom to their sanctions against Russia.

 

Overseas nuclear power plant construction involving Rosatom
	Reactor Type	Number of power units	summary
Turkey	VVER-1200	4 units	The continuous design of nuclear power plants based on the Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 project (Voronezh Oblast, Russia), with an estimated service life of 60 years for the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. On May 12, 2010, an intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Turkey on cooperation in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants at the Akkuyu site in Mersin Province, southern Turkey, was signed. On December 10, 2017, a ceremony was held to celebrate the start of construction based on the agreement. On December 10, 2017, a ceremony was held to commemorate the start of construction based on the agreement. the total output of the four units is 4.8 million kW. the total construction cost is approximately $20 billion. In August 2022, Rosatom signed an agreement with Gazprom Bank to open a line of credit ($9.1 billion) to finance the construction and development of Akkuyu Nuclear JSC, a Turkish subsidiary of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant.
Belarus	VVER-1200	2 units	Construction of the nuclear power plant is being carried out under the terms of the intergovernmental agreement between the governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus signed in March 2011, under the full responsibility of the general contractor (“turnkey”) In June 2021, Power Unit No. 1 began commercial operation In December 2021, physical startup (nuclear fuel loading) began at Power Unit No. 2 loading of fuel) begins.
Egypt	VVER-1200	4 units	In November 2015, Russia and Egypt signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the construction and operation of Egypt’s first nuclear power plant using Russian technology. four units with a total output of 4.8 million kW. on December 11, 2017, in Cairo, Alexei Likhachev, CEO of Rosatom, and Egyptian Power and Renewable Energy Minister Mohammad Shaker signed the act of entry into force of the commercial contract for the construction of this nuclear power plant. The contract to build Dabaa was agreed to be built in December 2018 between President Putin and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Russia agreed to loan Egypt $25 billion to finance the nuclear power plant, with Egypt to repay interest at 3% annually starting in 2029.On June 29, 2022, Los Atom announced that the Egyptian Nuclear and Radiation Regulatory Authority had issued a permit for the construction of the first power unit of the El Dabaa nuclear power plant. Construction of the first power unit already began in July, and on October 31, the state-owned company received a permit to build the second power unit.
India	VVER-1000	2 units in operation, 2 units under construction	The Kudankulam nuclear power plant is being built under an interstate agreement signed in November 1988 and its supplemental agreement dated June 21, 1998. unit 1 started commercial operation on December 31, 2014, and was officially put into commercial operation on August 10, 2016. unit 2 started generating electricity on August 29, 2016. In April 2014, the Russian Federation and India signed a broad framework agreement on the construction of the second phase of the nuclear power plant (Units 3 and 4) with Russian participation, and in December signed a document allowing its construction to begin On June 1, 2017, ASE (Rosatom State Corporation’s engineering arm) and the Atomic Energy Corporation of India signed a general framework agreement for the construction of the third stage (Units 5 and 6) of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant. Construction of Units 3, 4, 5, and 6 is currently underway. A total of six units, with a total capacity of 6 GW, are planned to be constructed.
Hungary	VVER-1200	2 units	Currently, four units with VVER-440 power reactors are in operation at the Soviet-designed Paksch nuclear power plant (total output of approximately 2 GW). The Hungarian parliament approved the construction of two new units in 2009; in December 2014, Rosatom and MVM (Hungary) signed a contract to build new units at the plant. In March of the same year, Russia and Hungary signed an agreement to provide up to 10 billion euros in financing for the completion of the Paks nuclear power plant (total project cost is 12.5 billion euros?) In August 2022, the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (OAN) granted permission to build two VVER-1200 generation “3+” power units (each unit (1.2 GW output per unit). In September of the same year, Rosatom began drilling at the construction site. In early December of the same year, Atomenergomash (the engineering division of the state-owned company) issued licenses to several Russian nuclear engineering companies (AEM Technology, Petrozavodskomash, Atomash, Tskubyem, etc.) from the Hungarian side to manufacture equipment for Paks 2.
Bangladesh	VVER-1200	2 units	In November 2011, an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the construction of Bangladesh’s first nuclear power plant, Rupur, was signed; the cornerstone was laid for the start of construction in the fall of 2013; the preparatory phase of the construction of Units 1 and 2 is underway; the construction of Unit 2 is underway; the construction of Unit 3 is underway. Construction is being financed by Russian loans (approximately $12.65 billion).On December 25, 2015, a general contract for the construction of the Rupur nuclear power plant in Bangladesh was signed.
China	VVER-1000 (4 units)、VVER-1200 (2 units)	4 units in operation, 2 units under construction	The first two units of the Tianwan NPP were built by a Russian company under an intergovernmental agreement between Russia and China signed in 1992, and began commercial operation in 2007. A general contract was signed in 2010 and entered into force in 2011. The construction of the second stage of the nuclear power plant is being carried out by Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation (JNPC).On December 30, 2017, power start-up of Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 took place. On October 27, 2018, power start-up of Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4 took place. On June 8, 2018, the Russian-Chinese A package of strategic documents setting out the main directions of cooperation development in the nuclear field in the coming decades was signed; two new power generating units with VVER-1200 3rd+ generation power reactors will be built. Units 7 and 8 at the Tianwan nuclear power plant.
	VVER-1200	2 units	On June 8, 2018, the Intergovernmental Protocol on Cooperation in the Serial Construction of the Xudian Nuclear Power Plant in China and the Framework Agreement for this purpose were signed. Based on these documents, the technical design contract for Units 3 and 4 of the plant was signed in March 2019, and the general contract for Units 3 and 4 of the Xudao Nuclear Power Plant was signed in June 2019. On the Russian side, the contract was signed by Atomstroyexport Joint Stock Company, and on the Chinese side by CNNC Corporation companies (Sunong Nuclear Power Company (CNSP), Liaoning Nuclear Power Company (CNLNPC), China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation (CNEIC)).
Finland	VVER-1200	1 unit	In December 2013, representatives of Rosatom signed a package of documents with the Finnish partner for the implementation of the project to build a kinetic nuclear power plant with a VVER-1200 power reactor with a total output of 1200 MW. Rosatom has a 34% stake in the project. Finland’s Fennovoima terminated its contract with the Russian company Rosatom in May 2022. The cost of the project involving Rosatom was estimated at €7-7.5 billion; construction was to begin in 2023 and commissioning in 2029.
Iran		2 units	Rosatom is providing services to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant. In November 2014, Russia and Iran signed a contract to build two new Bushehr power reactors on a turnkey basis, with a total capacity of 1 GW each for the two new reactors. The cost of the Bushehr-2 project is approximately $10 billion with construction of Unit 2 and Unit 3 to be completed in 2024 and 2026, respectively. Iran’s support for nuclear technology development in exchange for the supply of UAVs.
Uzbekistan	VVER-1200	2 units	In 2018, Uzbekistan and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the construction of a nuclear power plant in the country. The plant will be built on a site near Lake Tuskan in the Jizzakh region of the republic.
Myanmar			In September 2022, Los Atoms and Myanmar signed a roadmap for cooperation for the period 2022-2023, and in November agreed on a joint pre-feasibility study for a small-capacity nuclear power plant project. In February 2023, Russia and Myanmar signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the nuclear energy industry, which envisages the construction of small-capacity nuclear power plants.
Pakistan			According to Russian information in March 2022, Pakistan announced plans to launch 32 new nuclear power plants totaling 40 GW by 2050 (in addition to the 6 already existing nuclear power plants).
Saudi Arabia			As of 2011, Saudi Arabia wanted to build 16 nuclear power plants by 2030.
Iraq			In June 2021, Iraq announced its own program to build eight nuclear power plants with a total output of 11 GW by 2030.
Armenia, Uzbekistan, Myanmar, Brazil			In 2022, the company signed a memorandum of understanding to purchase nuclear infrastructure and training from Los Atoms.
Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.

 

The table shows that Russia has been trying to export nuclear power plants to so-called authoritarian states. It shows that Russia has been trying to conclude long-term diplomatic relations and expand its geopolitical power by doing so. In doing so, the Russian side has often used the method of providing loans to the exporting country, in effect building the nuclear power plant with Russian-supported funds so that it can exert influence over the partner country over the long term.

There is one thing to note here. One thing that is not on the table is Russia’s export of uranium enrichment-related facilities to China: in November 2007, Texnav Export and China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) signed a framework protocol on the construction of a plant to manufacture centrifuges for uranium enrichment. In May 2008, during Dmitry Medvedev’s first presidential visit to China, the two companies signed a contract to build a centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment. The contract amount of just over $1 billion also included the supply of low-enriched uranium from Russia to China for 10 years from 2010. Thus, China, which already has a uranium enrichment plant, can build a long-term cooperative relationship with Russia by constructing nuclear power plants overseas and exporting low-enriched uranium and nuclear fuel assemblies to them, using the same method as Russia. Even now, Rosatom is supplying nuclear fuel to China, with $375 million worth of nuclear fuel supplied in 2022.

 

Strategic Project “Breakthrough”

Rosatom is also ahead of the curve in the treatment of spent nuclear fuel. The company is currently implementing a project to convert the BN-800 reactor in Beloyarsk, Sverdlovsk Oblast, to plutonium-uranium MOX fuel made from depleted uranium and plutonium oxides generated in power reactors. In addition, the innovative lead-cooled BREST-OD-300 reactor, which began construction in June 2021 in Seversk, Tomsk Oblast, will operate on high-density nitride MOX fuel made from pellets made from plutonium and depleted uranium.

Reinjection of depleted uranium into the fuel cycle also solves the problem of so-called “uranium tailings” (tailings). In nuclear power generation over the years, a huge amount of DU “waste” in the form of hexafluoride (a compound of uranium and fluorine), which remains after uranium is enriched in a centrifuge, has accumulated in enrichment plants. For example, in Russia, there are more than 1 million tons of depleted uranium waste. In Russia, for example, this amount is more than 1 million tons. The production of plutonium-uranium fuel will not only phase out the stockpile of “waste” uranium, but will also allow it to be used as fuel for fast reactors for many years to come. To that end, Rosatom has a program to build a facility to reprocess depleted uranium from uranium hexafluoride to an oxide suitable for the nuclear fuel cycle.

Currently, less than 1% of the radioactive isotope uranium-235, which is used in power reactors to generate electricity, exists in nature, while the remaining uranium-238 is more than 90% stable. Russia’s dominance in fast reactors and nuclear recycling technology is being put into practice at the Siberian Chemical Complex in Severnsk. A pilot demonstration power plant is being built here as part of Rosatom’s strategic “Breakthrough” project. This site will be the first site in the world to combine both an innovative nuclear power unit with a 300 MW BREST-OD-300 fast reactor and a stationary closed nuclear fuel cycle with a nuclear fuel fabrication plant and spent fuel reprocessing module. After reprocessing, the irradiated fuel will be sent for reprocessing (remanufacturing of new fuel), making this system nearly self-sustaining and independent of external energy resources. This is truly a “breakthrough.”

This nuclear recycling technology can be applied not only to fast reactors, but also to thermal neutron reactors, which are the basis of modern nuclear power generation, such as the Russian VVER. Rosatom has already started experimental production of REMIX fuel made from recycled uranium and plutonium for the VVER-1000 based on two plants, the Siberian Chemical Complex in Severnsk and the Mine Chemical Complex in Jereznogorsk. This has the following advantages: 1) recycled uranium and plutonium can be used simultaneously in power reactors and are not separated when removed from spent fuel; 2) the amount of plutonium present is almost the same as that generated during operation of conventional fuel, so no major modifications to power reactors are required for its use. –(3) It has advantages such as Assembly of the first fuel assembly using REMIX fuel has already begun, and initial tests of an experimental assembly of individual fuel rods using REMIX fuel have yielded positive results. Once this technology is established, it can be applied to VVERs located abroad and will be the driving force behind Russia’s “enclosure” of these.

 

Moves to Reduce Dependence on Russia

Of course, moves to reduce dependence on Russia are spreading among Western countries. Even in such cases, however, measures must be considered in various fields, including uranium mining, low-enriched uranium (nuclear fuel assemblies) production, nuclear power plant construction, and reprocessing of spent fuel. For example, Cameco, the world’s second largest uranium supplier, has decided to reopen two of its major mines, while the Canadian mining company Global Atomic is developing a uranium mine in Niger and plans to bring it online in 2025.

There is also a push to revive uranium enrichment in the United States. In 2021, the U.S. Department of Energy gave the U.S. company Centrus Energy approval to produce highly stable, low-enriched uranium fuel (HALEU) for future smart power reactors at its facility in Ohio. (Russia is currently the only other country producing HALEU.) The U.S. believes it is possible to temporarily import enriched uranium from France or Japan.

In May, the European Commission submitted its “Repower EU” (RE PowerEU) plan following the European Council’s agreement in March 2022 to phase out Europe’s dependence on energy imports from Russia as quickly as possible. It aims to rapidly reduce Russia’s dependence on fossil fuels by speeding up a clean transition and joining forces to create a more resilient energy system and a true energy union. It noted that, in relation to nuclear power plants, “diversification options are also important for Member States that are currently dependent on Russia for nuclear fuel for power reactors12 or non-power reactors13 ,” and added that “cooperation within the EU and with international partners to secure alternative sources of uranium and to ensure that they are not only available in Europe or in the EU’s conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication capabilities available within Europe or at the EU’s global partners”. Already, the 2021 report of the European Atomic Energy Community (ESA) pointed out that “100% dependence on a single supplier for the design and source of VVER fuel remains the biggest concern in fuel fabrication.

Already, the Czech government has decided to purchase fuel for one of the VVERs from France’s Framatome and the U.S.-based Westinghouse beginning in 2024. The French nuclear fuel producer Orano announced after the invasion that it had “stopped all new shipments of nuclear material to and from Russia,” and Sweden has also shifted to other suppliers of mined and milled uranium and atomic fuel. As shown in the table introduced, in May 2022, Finland withdrew from its main power reactor deal with Rosatom. In June of the same year, Ukraine and Westinghouse signed an agreement to supply all fuel for Ukraine’s future VVER-1000 power reactors from its Swedish plant. Westinghouse is also developing the capability to service VVER-1000 power reactors on behalf of Rosatom, with support from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Argonne National Laboratory. However, it will be many years before such services can be provided on a global scale.

 

Rosatom Becoming an IT Industry

There is another, very different aspect to Rosatom. That is that the company is also a key player in the IT industry: in November 2019, Rosatom began developing a domestically produced quantum computer. The project was expected to last until 2024 and envisaged funding of 24 billion rubles; in November 2020, it was announced that Rosatom was developing a project to develop a market for domestically produced electronic components and equipment for “smart housing and utilities.” It is believed that Rosatom is also actively supporting the development and production of chips domestically. Furthermore, in July 2021, the government approved a new manufacturing technology roadmap through 2024 developed by the military holding company State Corporation Russian Technology (Rostec) and Rosatom. Software focused on systems to automate the design of various industrial products, Enterprise Business Management (ERP) and Customer Relationship Management (CRM), management of personnel documents, and management of equipment and its repair and maintenance. It is clear that Los Atoms is also involved in the development of these systems.

In addition, the January 20, 2023, edition of the Washington Post reported that documents revealed that Rosatom was working to supply missile fuel components, technology, and raw materials to the Russian weapons industry. In a letter from the head of Rosatom dated October 2022, obtained by Ukrainian intelligence, the letter refers to a recent meeting between the Ministry of Defense and representatives of the Russian military-industrial complex, and notes that Rosatom companies have offered to supply goods to Russian military units and Russian weapons manufacturers under sanctions It is said that the company has offered to provide goods to Russian military units and Russian weapons manufacturers under sanctions.

Thus, suspicions have arisen that Russia is supporting the Russian military-industrial complex in various fields, using Rosatom, which is not subject to sanctions, as a front. For this reason, sanctions against individual companies under the Rosatom umbrella are being considered.

On the other hand, Rosatom is also directly involved in the development of nuclear weapons: on February 21, 2023, in his State of the Union address, President Putin stated that, given the fact that the United States is developing a new type of nuclear warhead, “the Russian Ministry of Defense and Rosatom must ensure that Russia is prepared to test its nuclear weapons . Of course, we will not be the first to do so, but if the U.S. does, we will do it, too,” he clarified. Rosatom will be directly involved in the testing of new nuclear weapons. How will the Western nations react to this Rosatom’s freewheeling?

 

The Need for Global Wisdom

As explained here, the nuclear energy industry has a broad base, and it is not realistic to try to argue that Russia is “evil” and all cooperation with that nuclear energy industry should be stopped. Rather, we must point out that the use of nuclear energy as a measure against climate change is inevitable. On the other hand, the construction of nuclear power plants around the world could lead to a surge in violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), such as the problem of disposal of spent nuclear fuel (development of plutonium-based nuclear weapons) and development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium.

In this light, I strongly feel the need for a mechanism to strictly control and manage the nuclear energy industry on a global scale. The existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the international organization responsible for the realization of the NPT, but its neutrality is highly questionable. However, there is no explanation as to which side of the attack caused the damage. It is unlikely that the attack was caused solely by the Russian side, as claimed by President Zelensky. After all, the Russian side has had the ZNPP under its control since February 28, 2022. If that is the case, the IAEA should give strict orders to both Russia and Ukraine from the standpoint of protecting the security of the ZNPP, but its description appears to lean toward Ukraine.

I strongly believe that we need an international organization that is not led by the United States, Russia, or China, but by “people of the earth” to manage and regulate nuclear energy. It is unfortunate that nothing but vain idealism comes to mind. Nevertheless, I wrote this essay to help as many people as possible understand the current situation in which no one can explain the core of the problems surrounding nuclear energy.